Assuming random matching productivity, we propose a search equilibrium model where each match ends in a vacancy, in a temporary job or in a permanent job. Centralised bargaining sets the wage rate of permanent workers whereas firms decide unilaterally the wage rate of temporary workers. In this segmented labour market: a) the wage setting function can be downward sloping; b) higher union bargaining power leads to higher wages and higher unemployment; c) average worker productivity shows a maximum with respect to union bargaining power.
A Search Model in a Segmented Labour Market: the Odd Role of Unions [ottobre 2010] / Staffolani, Stefano; Broccolini, C.; Lilla, M.. - 349:(2010).
A Search Model in a Segmented Labour Market: the Odd Role of Unions [ottobre 2010]
STAFFOLANI, Stefano;
2010-01-01
Abstract
Assuming random matching productivity, we propose a search equilibrium model where each match ends in a vacancy, in a temporary job or in a permanent job. Centralised bargaining sets the wage rate of permanent workers whereas firms decide unilaterally the wage rate of temporary workers. In this segmented labour market: a) the wage setting function can be downward sloping; b) higher union bargaining power leads to higher wages and higher unemployment; c) average worker productivity shows a maximum with respect to union bargaining power.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
