Assuming random matching productivity, we propose a search equilibrium model where each match ends in a vacancy, in a temporary job or in a permanent job. Centralised bargaining sets the wage rate of permanent workers whereas firms decide unilaterally the wage rate of temporary workers. In this segmented labour market: a) the wage setting function can be downward sloping; b) higher union bargaining power leads to higher wages and higher unemployment; c) average worker productivity shows a maximum with respect to union bargaining power.

A Search Model in a Segmented Labour Market: the Odd Role of Unions [ottobre 2010] / Staffolani, Stefano; Broccolini, C.; Lilla, M.. - 349:(2010).

A Search Model in a Segmented Labour Market: the Odd Role of Unions [ottobre 2010]

STAFFOLANI, Stefano;
2010-01-01

Abstract

Assuming random matching productivity, we propose a search equilibrium model where each match ends in a vacancy, in a temporary job or in a permanent job. Centralised bargaining sets the wage rate of permanent workers whereas firms decide unilaterally the wage rate of temporary workers. In this segmented labour market: a) the wage setting function can be downward sloping; b) higher union bargaining power leads to higher wages and higher unemployment; c) average worker productivity shows a maximum with respect to union bargaining power.
2010
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11566/72256
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