The unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) operating in the proximity of critical infrastructures (CIs) require robust identification and authentication techniques, especially when radio frequency (RF) links are unreliable or are intentionally compromised. This work explores a physically intrinsic covert communication channel based on UAV chassis vibrations, which are induced by slight intentional modulations of the pulsewidth modulation (PWM) control signals driving the motors. Such PWM variations induce characteristic microvibrations that can be leveraged to encode communication symbols at both the displacement and frequency components. As a result, an ad hoc covert authentication scheme can be set up among two parties based on pre-established frequency-symbol mappings. A millimeter-wave frequency-modulated continuous wave (FMCW) radar is employed to perform remote and contactless measurements of these microvibrations using phase-based displacement extraction and micro-Doppler analysis. Extensive measurements are made by exploiting a quadcopter, testing several configurations of PWM signals, and quantifying their induced vibration signatures in terms of displacement–frequency spectra. For each configuration, we collect 30 independent vibration acquisitions to derive statistical metrics and calculate Type A measurement uncertainties. The results show that while the displacement amplitudes have considerable dispersion and are not always suitable as a stand-alone symbol carrier, the frequency of the induced peaks is meaningful to reliably encode symbols with low uncertainty. Frequencies that overlap with the drone’s natural modes are further explored to better understand resonance-driven amplification effects. Furthermore, the examination of second-harmonic components offers increased symbol detectability, ensuring greater robustness of the decoding strategy. These findings demonstrate the feasibility of a radar-measured vibrational covert channel for UAV authentication, providing a highly localized and tamper-resistant alternative to standard RF-based schemes.
Bring the Vibes: Radar Measurement of PWM-Driven Vibrational UAV Signatures / Ciattaglia, G., Peruzzi, G., Bertocco, M., Brighente, A., Gambi, E., Pozzebon, A., Spinsante, S.. - In: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INSTRUMENTATION AND MEASUREMENT. - ISSN 0018-9456. - 75:(2026), pp. 8514114.8514114-8514114.8514114. [10.1109/TIM.2026.3731710]
Bring the Vibes: Radar Measurement of PWM-Driven Vibrational UAV Signatures
Ciattaglia G.Primo
;Gambi E.;Spinsante S.
2026-01-01
Abstract
The unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) operating in the proximity of critical infrastructures (CIs) require robust identification and authentication techniques, especially when radio frequency (RF) links are unreliable or are intentionally compromised. This work explores a physically intrinsic covert communication channel based on UAV chassis vibrations, which are induced by slight intentional modulations of the pulsewidth modulation (PWM) control signals driving the motors. Such PWM variations induce characteristic microvibrations that can be leveraged to encode communication symbols at both the displacement and frequency components. As a result, an ad hoc covert authentication scheme can be set up among two parties based on pre-established frequency-symbol mappings. A millimeter-wave frequency-modulated continuous wave (FMCW) radar is employed to perform remote and contactless measurements of these microvibrations using phase-based displacement extraction and micro-Doppler analysis. Extensive measurements are made by exploiting a quadcopter, testing several configurations of PWM signals, and quantifying their induced vibration signatures in terms of displacement–frequency spectra. For each configuration, we collect 30 independent vibration acquisitions to derive statistical metrics and calculate Type A measurement uncertainties. The results show that while the displacement amplitudes have considerable dispersion and are not always suitable as a stand-alone symbol carrier, the frequency of the induced peaks is meaningful to reliably encode symbols with low uncertainty. Frequencies that overlap with the drone’s natural modes are further explored to better understand resonance-driven amplification effects. Furthermore, the examination of second-harmonic components offers increased symbol detectability, ensuring greater robustness of the decoding strategy. These findings demonstrate the feasibility of a radar-measured vibrational covert channel for UAV authentication, providing a highly localized and tamper-resistant alternative to standard RF-based schemes.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


