In this article I tackle the question of how the hierarchical order of mechanisms can be representedwithin a causal graph framework. I illustrate an answer to this question proposed by Casini, Illari, Russo, andWilliamson and provide an example that their formalism does not support two important features of nested mechanisms: (i) a mechanism's submechanisms are typically causally interacting with other parts of said mechanism, and (ii) intervening in some of a mechanism's parts should have some influence on the phenomena the mechanism brings about. Finally, I sketch an alternative approach taking (i) and (ii) into account. © 2014 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
A formal framework for representing mechanisms? / Gebharter, Alexander. - In: PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. - ISSN 0031-8248. - 81:1(2014), pp. 138-153. [10.1086/674206]
A formal framework for representing mechanisms?
Gebharter Alexander
Primo
Writing – Original Draft Preparation
2014-01-01
Abstract
In this article I tackle the question of how the hierarchical order of mechanisms can be representedwithin a causal graph framework. I illustrate an answer to this question proposed by Casini, Illari, Russo, andWilliamson and provide an example that their formalism does not support two important features of nested mechanisms: (i) a mechanism's submechanisms are typically causally interacting with other parts of said mechanism, and (ii) intervening in some of a mechanism's parts should have some influence on the phenomena the mechanism brings about. Finally, I sketch an alternative approach taking (i) and (ii) into account. © 2014 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
