In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally behave like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory of causation such as Woodward's () and discuss a possible objection to my causal Bayes net reconstruction.
Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets / Gebharter, Alexander. - In: PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH. - ISSN 1933-1592. - 95:2(2017), pp. 353-375. [10.1111/phpr.12247]