We develop a political economy theory of the endogenous emergence of fiscal crises based on the idea that the adjustment mechanism to a crisis favors some social groups, that may be induced ex‐ante to vote for fiscal policies that are more likely to lead to a crisis. Greater levels of favoritism lead to a higher public debt and more frequent crises, as well as to higher public expenditure, if the favored group is large enough. We provide conditions under which the favored group strategically favors a weaker state's fiscal capacity and when constitutional limits on debt raise the utility of all poor.
Engineering Crises: Favoritism and Strategic Fiscal Indiscipline / Saint-Paul, Gilles; Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andrea. - In: ECONOMICS & POLITICS. - ISSN 0954-1985. - 33:3(2021), pp. 583-610. [10.1111/ecpo.12175]
Engineering Crises: Favoritism and Strategic Fiscal Indiscipline
Davide Ticchi;
2021-01-01
Abstract
We develop a political economy theory of the endogenous emergence of fiscal crises based on the idea that the adjustment mechanism to a crisis favors some social groups, that may be induced ex‐ante to vote for fiscal policies that are more likely to lead to a crisis. Greater levels of favoritism lead to a higher public debt and more frequent crises, as well as to higher public expenditure, if the favored group is large enough. We provide conditions under which the favored group strategically favors a weaker state's fiscal capacity and when constitutional limits on debt raise the utility of all poor.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
Saint-Paul_Engineering-crises-Favoritism-strategic-fiscal_2021.pdf
Solo gestori archivio
Tipologia:
Versione editoriale (versione pubblicata con il layout dell'editore)
Licenza d'uso:
Tutti i diritti riservati
Dimensione
2.07 MB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
2.07 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
Saint-Paul_Engineering-crises-Favoritism-strategic-fiscal_Pre-print.pdf
accesso aperto
Tipologia:
Documento in pre-print (manoscritto inviato all’editore precedente alla peer review)
Licenza d'uso:
Licenza specifica dell’editore
Dimensione
463.53 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
463.53 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
Saint-Paul_Engineering-crises-Favoritism-strategic-fiscal_Post-print_2021.pdf
Open Access dal 29/03/2023
Tipologia:
Documento in post-print (versione successiva alla peer review e accettata per la pubblicazione)
Licenza d'uso:
Tutti i diritti riservati
Dimensione
247.32 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
247.32 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.