This article investigates patronage in the Second Italian Republic by considering patronage a fundamental device able to guarantee a party presence in the governance of public bodies. The study sheds light on a particular area of party patronage, namely political appointments concerning legislators; it analyzes the factors which could determine whether a member of Parliament will be appointed to a state-owned enterprise’s board of directors after a legislature, seeking to gain a better understanding of how political actors exploit this opportunity. Direct political connections can be conceptualized as instruments to control and reward politicians and/or strategies to enhance political control over the bureaucracy. The empirical investigation suggests that legislators’ efforts in Parliament play a role in the likelihood of patronage appointments. Education does not seem to significantly increase the probability of receiving a nomination for a seat on public firms’ boards, moreover our result casts doubt on the merits or competencies of the appointed politicians.

The economics of politics: patronage and political selection in Italy / Quaresima, F.; Fiorillo, F.. - In: ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE. - ISSN 1435-6104. - STAMPA. - 21:1(2020), pp. 27-48. [10.1007/s10101-019-00231-5]

The economics of politics: patronage and political selection in Italy

Quaresima F.;Fiorillo F.
2020-01-01

Abstract

This article investigates patronage in the Second Italian Republic by considering patronage a fundamental device able to guarantee a party presence in the governance of public bodies. The study sheds light on a particular area of party patronage, namely political appointments concerning legislators; it analyzes the factors which could determine whether a member of Parliament will be appointed to a state-owned enterprise’s board of directors after a legislature, seeking to gain a better understanding of how political actors exploit this opportunity. Direct political connections can be conceptualized as instruments to control and reward politicians and/or strategies to enhance political control over the bureaucracy. The empirical investigation suggests that legislators’ efforts in Parliament play a role in the likelihood of patronage appointments. Education does not seem to significantly increase the probability of receiving a nomination for a seat on public firms’ boards, moreover our result casts doubt on the merits or competencies of the appointed politicians.
2020
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11566/272039
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