This study investigates the effects produced by the electoral system on expenditure composition by exploring the case of Italian regions over the period 1986–2009. Empirical analysis shows that the regional current transfers expenditure distributed to families and firms significantly decreases when the regional electoral system moves from being proportional to mixed. Particularly striking is the reduction in preelectoral years under the regional mixed regime.
Electoral rules and public spending composition: The case of Italian regions / Santolini, Raffaella. - In: CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY. - ISSN 1074-3529. - ELETTRONICO. - 35:3(2017), pp. 551-577. [10.1111/coep.12205]
Electoral rules and public spending composition: The case of Italian regions
SANTOLINI, Raffaella
2017-01-01
Abstract
This study investigates the effects produced by the electoral system on expenditure composition by exploring the case of Italian regions over the period 1986–2009. Empirical analysis shows that the regional current transfers expenditure distributed to families and firms significantly decreases when the regional electoral system moves from being proportional to mixed. Particularly striking is the reduction in preelectoral years under the regional mixed regime.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
