The energy transition: is decarbonization driving a redistribution of resources?

This paper provides a critical analysis of the energy transition in Italy, examining whether current decarbonization policies serve a collective benefit or function as a regressive resource redistribution mechanism. The study highlights how the technical architecture of the Italian energy market allows renewable energy producers to capture significant rents by pegging prices to expensive natural gas. This pricing inefficiency shifts the financial burden of the transition onto households and firms through system charges on electricity bills, triggering a risk of energy poverty. The analysis further explores how the push for renewables has created a lucrative speculative market, attracting opaque interests and facilitating "green grabbing" practices. It notes that major fossil fuel producers often utilize these schemes to offset their emissions through carbon credits without altering their core production models. Additionally, the paper critiques the lack of scientific rigor in assessing the productivity of industrial-scale plants in regions like Sardinia. Finally, referring to a game theory framework, unilateral decarbonization efforts by individual blocs like the EU risk imposing domestic sacrifices without achieving a tangible global impact, given the lack of international cooperation from other major CO2 emitters. The paper concludes that a fundamental redesign of the subsidy and pricing framework is essential to ensure a "just transition" that prioritizes social equity and scientific accuracy.