Central Bank Autonomy without Monetary Policy

The autonomy of a country’s central bank from political authorities has been advocated both as a remedy against the inflationary bias that would otherwise be present in the conduct of the government’s monetary policy and, more recently, on the basis of empirical evidence. However, both theoretical arguments and empirical findings have associated central bank autonomy with the conduct of monetary policy, while often failing to pay attention to those institutional cases where a central bank is in place but is not responsible for the conduct of monetary policy. These cases are particularly relevant for those countries which do not possess their own currency, or where extreme monetary regimes such as dollarization, currency boards, or monetary unions are present. These institutional settings, where a central bank exists, but there is no monetary policy to be conducted, raise the issue of central bank autonomy in a framework where the inflation bias is no longer pertinent. In other words: Is central bank autonomy still a relevant objective when a country does not run its own monetary policy? The present paper addresses this question, discusses dimensions of autonomy and accountability and maintains that central bank autonomy still does matter, particularly if the central bank is responsible for bank supervision and financial regulation